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ABSTRACT
The usage of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is growing fast. Moreover, the lack of security
measures among the IoT devices and their persistent online connection give adversaries an oppor-
tunity to exploit them for multiple types of attacks, such as distributed denial-of-service (DDoS).
To understand the risks of IoT devices, we analyze IoT malware from an endpoint standpoint. We
investigate the relationship between endpoints infected and attacked by IoT malware, and gain
insights into the underlying dynamics in the malware ecosystem. We observe the affinities and
different patterns among endpoints. Towards this, we reverse-engineer 2,423 IoT malware sam-
ples and extract IP addresses from them. We further gather information about these endpoints
from Internet-wide scans. For masked IP addresses, we examine their network distribution, with
networks accumulating more than 100 million endpoints. Moreover, we conduct a network pen-
etration analysis, leveraging information such as active ports, vulnerabilities, and organizations.
We discover the possibility of ports being an entry point of attack and observe the low presence
of vulnerable services in dropzones. Our analysis shows the tolerance of organizations towards
endpoints with malicious intent. To understand the dependencies among malware, we highlight
dropzone characteristics including spatial, network, and organizational affinities. Towards the anal-
ysis of dropzones’ interdependencies and dynamics, we identify dropzones chains. In particular,
we identify 56 unique chains, which unveil coordination among different malware families. Our
further analysis of chains suggests a centrality-based defense and monitoring mechanism to limit
malware propagation. Finally, we propose a defense based on the observed measures, such as the
blocked/blacklisted IP addresses or ports. In particular, we investigate network-level and country-
level defenses, by blocking a list of ports that are not commonly used by benign applications, and
study the underlying issues and possible solutions of such a defense.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
IoT has reshaped the way in which people, businesses, and even cities interact with their environ-
ment through Internet-connected devices. Whether it is remotely unlocking a smart door lock [86]
or accessing your home appliances from anywhere in the world. There is no doubt that IoT de-
vices have benefited the global economy and made our lives more efficient. The number of IoT
devices soaring into the tens of billions [28, 56], and Gartner, a global research and advisory firm,
predicts that the number of IoT devices will grow to 25 billion by 2021, from 14.2 billion devices
in 2019 [68]. However, potential adversaries have set their sights on these devices knowing that
they are always connected and online. The majority of these IoT devices are at a high risk to the
new threats due to the lack of security awareness among consumers and the lack of consensus on
security standards among the IoT industry [62]. Also, given the low computational power of the
IoT devices, a single device would not be sufficient to carry out an attack [22]. However, exploit-
ing IoT’s scale, adversaries form a network of bots or intermediary targets, large enough to launch
an attack of substantial magnitude. As the number of applications of IoT devices is significantly
increasing, so is the number of malicious software (malware) targeting IoT, which have seen a
consistent increase in the past few years as well [52]. In part due to their sheer number, as well as
the constrained operation environments (e.g., limited standards, lack of maintenance and updates,
etc.), IoT devices are more likely to be a target for malware infections, bringing about botnets used
often in launching catastrophic distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks [17, 50, 63, 81].
With the vulnerability of the IoT devices against adversaries, such devices can be easily exploited
and controlled. For instance, Bashlite (also known as Gafgyt, LizardStresser, Lizkebab, Qbot, and
Torlus) is a malware family that exploits default login IDs and passwords to propagate and infect
targets [24]. Based on this infection, the Bashlite malware family made a large botnet that is capa-
ble of launching large DDoS attacks [55]. Among many capabilities that Bashlite has, it can update
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bots payload, in continuous evolution and morphing, and—more interestingly–remove competing
botnets from infected hosts [53]. Mirai is the most notorious malware successor of the Bashlite,
and has been used for demonstrating some significant damages by launching DDoS attacks several
times on several pieces of critical infrastructure and prominent services [22]. Among other inci-
dents, Mirai’s attacks temporarily disrupted “Krebs on Security” (security blog) [51], OVH (cloud
computing company) [42], and Dyn (domain service company) [48]. In the case of the Dyn attack,
many other services, such as Airbnb, Github, and Twitter, among others, were indirectly affected.
The same botnet was able to take down the Internet of the African nation of Liberia [64].
Competition and coordination among botnets are not well explored, although recent reports have
highlighted the potential of such competition as demonstrated in adversarial behaviors of Gafgyt
towards competing botnets [53]. Understanding a phenomenon in behavior is important for multi-
ple reasons. First, such analysis would highlight the competition and alliances among IoT botnets
(or malactors; i.e., those who are behind the botnet), which could shed light on cybercrime eco-
nomics. Second, understanding such competition would necessarily require appropriate analysis
modalities, and such competition signifies those modalities, even when they are already in use.
Third, the signified modalities may shed light on possible effective defenses; e.g., a piece of infras-
tructure used by the majority of infected hosts in an IoT botnet makes an excellent candidate for a
botnet takedown.
Considering the landscape and the risks IoT devices possess, the malware authors can exploit the
vulnerability to either attack them or hire them as intermediary targets for a future large scale
attack. Reckoning that the malware sources, command and control (C2) servers, the intermediary
targets, and the victim must be connected to the Internet in the attack scenario, which makes it
important to study these endpoints.
2
1.1 Motivation
The focus of this work is to conduct a comprehensive analysis of endpoints in IoT malware, in-
cluding sources, C2’s, intermediary targets, and victims. In particular, we formulate questions that
we answer through a data-driven analysis to find the correlations between the endpoints of the
dropzones and targets, addressing the following:
Dropzone-Target Inter-Relationships. Since malware associated with certain dropzones point
to specific target IP addresses, could these IP addresses be similar or identical to the addresses
of targets in other dropzones? To answer this, we reverse-engineered and analyzed the malware’s
disassembly to extract all target IP addresses for each dropzone.
Geographical Analysis. What are the characteristics of the areas where the dropzones are located?
How does this affect the distribution of dropzones and targets? For that, we analyze the distribu-
tions of the distance between the dropzones and their targets, and look at these distributions from
various perspectives at the country and state level.
Attack Exposure. How exposed are the IP addresses in the target’s network address space? To-
wards this, we analyze the targets and look for vulnerabilities in the services that they use. For the
masked targets, we analyze the network space and examine their up-to-date susceptibility.
Network Penetration Analysis. What are the vulnerable services being used for both dropzones
and target IP addresses? Which organizations own these IP addresses and how do they affect the
dropzone-target relationships? We analyze the attributes of dropzone and target IP addresses such
as their active network ports, owning organization, and known vulnerabilities from Internet-wide
scanners; Shodan and Censys [3].
To this end, we analyze the characteristics of the IP addresses, using a search engine that retrieves
the characteristics of the IP addresses. The features we collect are the ports that are active on the
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endpoint devices, known vulnerabilities related to the addresses, and organizations that operate the
IP addresses. In this work, we set questions that we answer through conducting experiments and
network and endpoint analysis.
1.2 Approaches
Analyze IoT Malware Ecosystem. In this work, we extracted endpoints from IoT malware sam-
ples by reverse-engineering those samples and perform a data-driven study to analyze their dif-
ferent traces, such as geographical affinities, organizations, open ports, and their susceptibility to
attacks. We also try to understand the pattern shared among victims by different malware.
Network Penetration Analysis. We focused on the network penetration analysis, which is the
characteristics contained in the IP address, leveraged the information gathered from a search engine
for Internet-connected devices, such as active ports, vulnerabilities and organizational information.
The vulnerabilities in the dropzones reflect that the attackers override their authentication status
and then utilize the OpenSSH vulnerabilities to gain access to the device. Our analysis also sheds
light on the tolerance of organizations towards the endpoints with malicious intent. The tug of war
between the profit and the loss of trust among the users (prospective domain buyers) deserve the
community’s focus.
Malware Behavior Analysis. We attempt to understand the dynamics between different IoT bot-
nets through the lenses of static analysis hoping to unveil competitive behaviors among those bot-
nets. By obtaining endpoints from the residual strings of IoT malware binaries upon static analysis,
we proceed to categorize those endpoints based on the context in which they appear into dropzones
and targets. Dropzones are IP addresses used by the malware to control bots and to retrieve up-
dated malware binaries (payloads) or scripts from an external server. Targets, on the other hand,
are IP addresses subjected to an attack by the malware sample being analyzed.
4
1.3 Roadmap
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we introduce a unified related
work based borrowing contents from several studies by the dissertation author. In chapter 3, we
introduce our analysis of the IoT ecosystem. In chapter 4, we introduce our analysis of the IoT
malware network penetration analysis. Both of these chapters are based on our work published in
ACM HoTWot 2019 [26]. In chapter 5, we introduce our analysis of the dynamics and interde-
penendeices in IoT malware through the lenses of dropzone-target chains, which is based on our
work published in IEEE IDSC 2019 [25]. In chapter 6, we introduce our insight into defenses. A
brief discussion is introduced in chapter 7, followed by concluding remarks in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2: RELATEDWORK
2.1 IoT Malware Ecosystem Analysis
Recent studies related to IoT malware in the past few years have primarily focused on classify-
ing IoT Malware. Su et al. [78] proposed a light-weight classification system based on image
recognition that was tested on real IoT malware samples collected by IoTPOT [66], one of the
first honeypots specifically for IoT threats. Using a dataset of 500 malware samples comprised of
multiple families (including the Mirai botnet and Linux.Gafgyt) and benign samples from Ubuntu
16.04.3 system files, they converted each sample into 64x64 gray-scale images that were fed into
a convolutional neural network achieving an average accuracy of 94%. Abusnaina et al. [15]
presented Graph Embedding and Augmentation (GEA), a method to generate adversarial IoT soft-
ware. With their approach, they successfully achieved a high misclassification rate in Control Flow
Graph (CFG)-based features and deep learning network detection method, while ensuring that the
generated software is executable.
Cozzi et al. [27] investigated the different patterns and trends among the Linux malware in depth.
Sivanathan et al. [74] analyzed the traffic of smart IoT environments gathered over a period of 3
weeks to characterize different traffic attributes. They differentiate IoT traffic from other traffic as
well as identifying IoT devices with an accuracy of 95%. Alasmary et al. [18–20] studied methods
of malware detection based on graph-based features from CFGs. They show that CFGs, even
with smaller size than similar software, can be powerful in identifying IoT applications, including
distinguishing between benign and malicious ones. Related work on analyzing malware of other
systems and evaluating the accuracy of their detection using various modalities are explored in [59,
60, 72].
West and Mohaisen [83] used 28,000 expert-labeled endpoints extracted from ≈100K malware
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binaries for binary threat classification with an accuracy of 99.4%. The endpoints were extracted
using dynamic execution of malware in a sandboxed environment. Ouellette et al. [65] used deep
learning to detect malicious endpoints. They used the features from obfuscated malware samples
to feed to the classifier that performing classification on the cloud. Rafique and Caballero [70] used
the network signatures from executing malware binaries to cluster them into families. Although
limited, prior works have looked into investigating Linux malware, and the malware endpoints
have not received the attention. Antonakakis et al. [22] analyzed the relationship between domains
that were extracted by reverse-engineering the Mirai malware. With this work, we push towards
filling the gap.
2.2 Network Penetration Analysis
Studies have also utilized a combination of Shodan, an Internet-wide search engine for IoT de-
vices [12], and known vulnerability databases to realize the potential risks inherent to Internet-
connected devices. For example, Genge and Enachescu [41] proposed ShoVAT (Shodan-based
Vulnerability Assessment Tool) and collected IoT device information such as open ports, when
they were scanned, banner data, and their operating system through the Shodan API. They then
used this information to confirm their identities in the NVD and revealed 3,922 known vulnerabili-
ties among 1,501 services in 12 different institutions. Formby et al. [40] security challenges in the
existing Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and address them by leveraging fingerprinting methods.
Feng et al. [39] proposed a rule to discover and annotate IoT devices.
2.3 Dynamics and Interdependencies in IoT Botnets
Malware analysis helps to understand the behavior of the malware, thus defending against it. Dy-
namic analysis executes malware in a monitored environment and observes its behavior and func-
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tionality [84]. In contrast, Static analysis inspects the executable files without executing them. It
analyzes the malware through the strings and function calls necessary for malware operation and
structure. Kendall et al. [49] described the static analysis in-depth, a malware executable file might
be disclosing only basic properties such as file type, the checksum for file fingerprinting, simple
extractable strings and Dynamic-Link Library (DLL) import information, or fully disassembled
with powerful tools and specialized knowledge. One of the obstacles to static analysis of malware
is code obfuscation. Moser et al. [61] examined the limitations of the static analysis in the de-
tection of malicious code. Soliman et al. [75] set a taxonomy for the tools and analysis method.
They analyze the pros and cons of each static and dynamic analysis approaches. The prior work
focused on analyzing IoT malware and evolution. However, it is equally important to understand
the communication and relationships between bots to fully understand the operation of a malware,
thus defensing against them.
Several IoT malware have the capability to launch DDoS attacks [30]. Mirai is one of the notori-
ous IoT malware that is targeting vulnerable IoT devices such as Digital Video Recorders (DVRs),
security cameras, routers [22]. Wang et al. analyzed multiple IoT malware and categorized them
by the approach in which they infect targets, such as, brute-forcing the weak user credentials, and
exploiting vulnerabilities found in the devices. They found that Mirai brute-force the target based
on the dictionary of popular usernames and passwords [82]. Sinanovic´ presented the result of the
dynamic and static analysis of Mirai. They set up a virtual environment for dynamic analysis to
replicate controlled DDoS attack [73]. Similarly, Ceron et al. [24] studied DDoS capable mal-
ware, such as Mirai and Bashlite by handling the network traffic. They utilized Software-Defined
Networking to control the network environment. Furthermore, De Donno et al. [31] studied the
taxonomy of DDoS attacks in the different subject of IoT. They did a detailed analysis of how
Mirai’s design and components perform their attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no recent work that analyzes the relationships between the
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endpoints of IoT malware dropzones and their target devices. With that said, the closest study
to our work is by Holz et al. [45] who presented one of the first empirical studies of malware and
dropzones. Specifically, they focused on keyloggers and harvested data from dropzones which con-
tained stolen credentials. Since keyloggers typically contact dropzones upon execution (to obtain
a configuration file), the authors managed to successfully obtain the locations of several dropzones
from several Autonomous Systems and countries, shown to be Russia and the US, among others.
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CHAPTER 3: IOT MALWARE ECOSYSTEM IN THEWILD: ANALYSIS
AND EXPOSURES1
3.1 Motivation
We perform IP centric analysis and network centric analysis. In the IP centric analysis, we analyze
the dropzone-target inter-relationships. Specifically, we investigate the target IP addresses among
different dropzone IP addresses. Also, we perform a geographical analysis of the dropzones and
targets. Towards this, we analyze the locations of dropzones and their target IP addresses. In the
network centric analysis, we analyze the attack exposure of networks and IP addresses. For masked
target endpoints, we examine the entire network and study the network devices and their exposure
to risk.
The goal of this work is to analyze the affinities between IoT malware endpoints. Towards this
goal, we make the following contributions:
• We analyze the dropzone-target inter-relationships. Specifically, we investigate the target IP
addresses among different dropzone IP addresses.
• We perform a geographical analysis of the dropzones and targets. Towards this, we analyze
the locations of dropzones and their target IP addresses.
• We analyze the attack exposure of networks and IP addresses. For the masked target end-
points, we examine the entire network and study the network devices and their exposure to
risk.
1This content was reproduced from the following article: J. Choi∗, A. Anwar∗, H. Alasmary, J. Spaulding, D.
Nyang and A. Mohaisen, “IoT Malware Ecosystem in the Wild: A Glimpse into Analysis and Exposures”. The
Second ACM/IEEE Workshop on Hot Topics on Web of Things, HotWoT, pp. 413-418, Arlington, VA, USA, 2019.
∗Equal Contributors. The copyright form for this article is included in the appendix.
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Table 3.1: Distribution of malware by family. DZ - Dropzone.
Target family Count Pct. DZ family Count Pct.
Gafgyt 930 95.58 Gafgyt 2,294 98.96
Tsunami 39 4.01 Tsunami 24 1.04
SINGLETON 3 0.31 - - -
Lightaidra 1 0.10 - - -
3.2 Dataset
We describe our dataset and its augmentation towards our goal. We then describe the aims and the
objectives of this work. Specifically, we use an IoT malware dataset, perform static analysis on
them, and finally use the strings to extract endpoints from them. We obtain our dataset from IoT-
POT [66], a honeypot that emulates the Telnet services (later improved to include other services).
We obtained a total of 2,423 IoT malware samples, which were graciously given to us by the au-
thors of IoTPOT. The dataset represents four different malware families, labelled by augmenting
the results from VirusTotal (VT) and by using AVClass [71]. For malware samples that do not have
a decisive family label from the VT results, those malware samples are labeled as SINGLETON.
The distribution of malware families can be seen in Table. 3.1.
We reverse-engineer and analyze the malware samples using Radare2 [11], an open-source mal-
ware analysis framework. We find strings in the malware binary, especially IP addresses, and
classify those addresses by their association with special keywords into two classes: dropzone
and target IP addresses, defined as follows:
• Dropzone IP. Adversaries often keep malware binaries in remote servers to distribute them
after gaining access to victim devices. These remote servers are identified by dropzone IP
addresses, controlled and managed by the adversary and used for malware propagation and
management. As such, the dropzone IP addresses are associated with wget, HTTP, TFTP,
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GET or FTP in the residual strings obtained from the malware analysis.
• Target IP. To infect victim hosts, malware uses a list of IP addresses, including target de-
vices. We refer to these IP addresses as targets. We note that a large number of those
target addresses in our analysis are masked. For example, 123.17.%d.%d is one of the target
IP address that is masked at /16; the attacker can utilize this address targeting all IPs in the
network address space.
Also, we found the internal network addresses (e.g., 192.168.%d.%d), loopback address (e.g.,
127.0.0.1) from our target dataset and remove them, since they are irrelevant to our analysis. Also,
we note that the Mirai source code contained a list of “don’t scan” addresses, including various
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) address blocks, as well as internal addresses [44], which we
exclude. Fig. 3.1 shows the dropzone and target in the malware life-cycle, including dropzone
setting, victim host (target) compromise, and download of malware from the dropzone to the target.
3.2.1 Data Augmentation
We group the target and dropzone addresses by malware. Since a dropzone can be used by multiple
malware, and to help analyze the overall sample-space a dropzone caters to, we cluster the target
IPs by each dropzone. Using UltraTools [13], a free DNS and domain lookup tool, and Censys [3],
a search engine for Internet-connected devices, each of the targets and dropzones is augmented
with the following information: country, ASN (Autonomous System Number), and location (e.g.,
latitude and longitude), open ports, etc. We observe some dropzone addresses have no current
information, e.g., they are no longer connected to the Internet. This confirms that the dropzones
are short-lived—long enough to carry out an attack and short not to be detected. As such, we
leverage historical data of those IP addresses from Shodan [12] to determine the necessary data
points associated with them.
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Dropzone
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Dropzone IP
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Figure 3.1: An overview of the dropzone and target in the malware life-cycle. 1©: The attacker
uses pre-configured or infected server (dropzone) for attack propagation. 2©: The attacker try to
propagate to targets by exploiting vulnerabilities. 3©: The malware accesses the dropzone and
download scripts and payload to the target. 4©: The malware targets potential victim devices in a
target IP list. 5©: The infected target devices repeat the process.
3.2.2 Preliminary Results
The distribution of the target addresses exposes family-level affinities by highlighting what set of
addresses is being targeted by different malware. In particular, we observe a total of 106,428 target
IP addresses, resulting in 2,211 unique target IP addresses associated with 973 malware samples.
This makes the analysis of affinities, by understanding what makes these target IP addresses the
favorite among malware authors, of paramount importance. The use of dropzone IP addresses by
the malware exhibits that the malware shares dropzones among themselves, with some contacting
multiple dropzones for commands. In particular, for the dropzones, we find that 877 unique drop-
zone IP addresses are being shared by 2,318 malware samples with 2,407 occurrences. Moreover,
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Figure 3.2: Data collection and extraction system. 1©: Collecting malware binaries from IoTPOT.
2©: Assigning known malware family names to the dataset. 3©: Reverse-engineering and extracting
strings from binaries. 4©: Separating IP addresses based on nearby keywords. 5©: Augmenting IP
addresses with Censys and Shodan data.
while we successfully extract dropzone IP addresses from the majority of malware samples, we can
find target IP addresses only in fewer malware samples. This shows a thought pattern of malware
authors, i.e., while they share the dropzone IP addresses in the static code, however, they do not
reveal the target IP addresses. This can be because they obfuscate this part of the code, employ
domain generation algorithms, or use a custom list of IP addresses in the downloaded binary file
(i.e., DNS.txt) from a dropzone at run-time, as shown in Fig. 3.3.
We also notice that 40% of the malware samples contain target IP addresses, while 95.66% of them
contain dropzones in their strings. We also observe disassembled codes of malware samples that
have dropzone but no targets, which is explained either: (i) code-based generation of IP addresses,
rather than static IP address listing [21, 23], and (ii) packing.
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wget \%s −q −O DNS. t x t
| | busybox wget \%s −O DNS. t x t
| | / b i n / busybox wget \%s −O DNS. t x t
| | / u s r / busybox wget \%s −O DNS. t x t
Figure 3.3: Retrieving a list of target hosts.
Table 3.2: Top 5 dropzone IPs per the number of targets. Countries include: France (FR), United
Kingdom (GB), Canada (CA) and United States (US).
Rk. Dropzone IP Country #Malware #Targets
1 163.172.104.150 FR 35 9,529
2 145.239.72.250 FR 22 5,632
3 45.76.131.35 GB 17 4,352
4 64.137.253.50 CA 26 3,066
5 198.175.126.89 US 11 2,816
3.3 Dropzone-Target Inter-Relationship
We inspect the dropzone-target relationship, we examine the affinity between the dropzone and
the target IP addresses. While ≈77% of the unique target IPs received less than 10 attacks, one
unique target IP received 72 attacks. We found one dropzone IP (50.115.166.193) that was
only associated with 1 malware sample. This malware sample pointed to 1,265 network addresses,
which was significantly larger than the average of 121 target IP addresses for a typical malware
sample. Also, they are masked network addresses, which means that one target network address
can be larger dynamically. Conversely, the dropzone IP (5.189.171.210) has 86 associated
malware samples, but each of those point to a single target IP address.
Dropzones can be found distributed mainly in North America and Europe. Moreover, through our
further analysis we found that the first IP address (163.172.104.150) (Table 3.2) is associated
with 35 malware samples affecting 9,529 target IPs.
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3.3.1 Shared Targets Between Dropzones
To inspect the shared targets between dropzone IP addresses, we group the dropzone IP addresses
and capture the common (overlapping) targets among the dropzones. Since dropzones can be
associated with multiple instances of malware, each malware can have its own list of target IP
addresses. If we assume that a dropzone has a union of target IPs for each malware belonging
to that particular dropzone, we can aggregate all of their target IPs into a larger set of target IPs.
We denote Udz as the union of all target IPs for a particular dropzone. To analyze the overlapping
target IP addresses and to understand the criteria for choosing target addresses, we compare Udz of
each combination of dropzone addresses from a dataset of 877 unique dropzone addresses. Using
combinations, we found combinations of
(
877
2
)
=
877!
2!(877− 2)! = 384, 126.
Upon removing 365,968 cases that do not have common target IP between them, we reduce the
combination to 18,158 dropzone IP pairs. This dataset of 18,158 dropzone IP pairs is a combination
of only 247 unique dropzone IP addresses, from the dataset of 877 unique dropzone IP addresses.
Also, we find 71 cases that had more than 300 overlapped target IPs, and there are 2,199 cases
(12.11%) which are 100% overlapped between dropzones. Overall, we find 6,451 cases (35.53%)
in which the overlap is more than 80%.
3.3.2 Summary
It is evident from the results of the above analysis that a large number of targets are being shared
between dropzones. If the target IP addresses between different dropzones are matched 100%, it
is possible that the attacker obtained the same targets through similar vulnerability analysis (i.e.,
Shodan) or shared the target list from other attackers through underground communities.
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Figure 3.4: CDF graphs showing the distribution of the number of overlapped target IP addresses
and their ratio.
3.4 Geographical Analysis
In this section, we focus on the distribution of the distances between the dropzones and their tar-
get IPs. It will be apparent that a large number of dropzone-target pairs have a certain range of
distances, which is related to the distribution of dropzones and their targets in each country. For
example, we noticed that there are several target IPs located in Vietnam, Brazil, and China. To vi-
sualize the flow of attacks in a holistic sense, we plotted circular areas whose sizes are proportional
to the number of targets and are placed according to their location on a world map with geodesic
lines originating from various dropzone locations (see Fig. 3.6).
3.4.1 Distance Between Dropzone and Target
As mentioned previously, a dropzone IP can be associated with several malware instances where
each malware can point to one or more target IPs. Knowing the locations of these IPs, we calculate
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Figure 3.5: Histogram graph of distances between dropzone and target IPs. One bar represents the
number of dropzone-target pairs with a distance that has a value within the range of x-axis.
Table 3.3: Top 5 countries by the number of target and dropzone IPs. Countries include: United
States (US), Netherlands (NL), France (FR), United Kingdom (GB), Italy (IT), Vietnam (VN),
Brazil (BR), China (CN), India (IN) and Pakistan (PK).
Rk. Country Dropzones Pct. Rk. Country Targets Pct.
1 US 1,041 43.25 1 VN 26,290 24.70
2 NL 278 11.55 2 BR 20,572 19.33
3 FR 188 7.81 3 CN 15,799 14.84
4 GB 183 7.60 4 IN 5,598 5.26
5 IT 177 7.35 5 PK 5,076 4.77
the distance between the dropzone and its target if they are related to the same malware instance.
Each distance shows the locality of the attack. The total number of calculated distance cases is
111,480. Fig. 3.5 presents an alternate view with a histogram plot of the distances between the
dropzones and their target IPs.
Our result of the majority of the distance shows the 8K-10K km range had the most frequent
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Figure 3.6: Attack trends between dropzones and target IPs. We only plot attacks that have over
500 target IPs. The orange circle represents dropzones, and blue, red, and green circles stand for
target areas.
number of cases totaling 34,479 (30.93% of all dropzone-target distance cases). In this range,
countries with the most target IPs are Brazil, Vietnam, and China, in order; while the dropzones
are in European countries, including Italy, France, and the Netherlands. According to Table 3.3,
a large number of dropzones exist in the US, but they also have target IPs in Brazil, Vietnam, and
China, with distance between dropzone and target in the range of 12K-14K km and 10K-12K km.
3.4.2 Country-level Analysis
In this part, we look at the overall attack trend between dropzones and their targets on a world-
scale. For each dropzone, we collect all of the target IP addresses and extract location information
(e.g., latitude, longitude) to display the average position of the target area (not the exact position).
The target areas are scaled according to the number of target IP addresses they contain. Fig. 3.6
shows the results of our country-level analysis, where we limit to only plotting dropzones with
more than 500 target IP addresses. The locations of the dropzones (depicted in orange) are spread
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around various countries, but we highlight that there is a large concentration of target areas focused
in Central Asia.
Table. 3.3 lists top 5 countries by the number of dropzone and target IPs. Note that the US has a
large distribution of dropzones pointing to targets in Asian countries such as Vietnam. Addition-
ally, China and Brazil contain a large number of target IP addresses originating from European
countries. Imperva Incapsula (a global content delivery network and DDoS mitigation company)
confirms that Vietnam (12.8%), Brazil (11.8%) and China (8.8%) were the countries with the most-
infected devices (from the Mirai botnet) [44]. Moreover, intuitively, these countries should contain
the highest representation of vulnerable devices, such as devices with default credentials or known
vulnerabilities. To validate the former, we query “default password” in Shodan. Fig. 3.7 shows the
result of searching in Shodan. We find Taiwan, the United States, China, Vietnam, and Thailand in
the top five countries, which is partially counter-intuitive. In Vietnam, the Deputy Director-General
of Ministry of Information and Communication’s Authority of Information Security indicated the
number of cyber threats and criminals increasing. Moreover, there are a large number of no-name
IoT devices used in the country, such as cameras, which pose a threat to cybersecurity. That lead
the Vietnamese government to develop a national strategy, including specific policies and regula-
tions for IoT products [36]. As reported by the National Law Review [67], the EU and the US
are the most developed regions in regards with establishing IoT Regulations and ethical frame-
works. They have enacted standards and regulations for the devices connected, the network and
their security; and the data associated with the devices.
3.4.3 Region-level Analysis
Using regional information from IPinfo [8], we plot a heatmap representing the distribution of
dropzones and targets for the entire United States. In Fig. 3.8(a), we see that Washington state
and New Jersey contain a high concentration of dropzones. Interestingly, the Washington and New
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Figure 3.7: Result of searching for the “default password” in Shodan. This result indicates East
Asia countries are exposed threat of malware.
York states have lots of data centers as reported by Statista, an online portal for statistics [57]. We
discuss this issue further in §4. Likewise, we see in Fig. 3.8(b) that a high number of target IPs
reside in Florida and New Mexico. Table. 3.4 lists the detailed breakdown of the top 5 dropzone
and target IPs according to their US State. In all, we had 1,037 dropzone IPs distributed over 20
US States and 1,650 target IPs spread over 22 US States.
3.4.4 City-level Analysis
We utilize the search engine Shodan [12] to look up the actual city in which the given dropzone IPs
are, and use IPinfo to find the city information of the target IPs (whenever available). We note that
in our data, city information may not exist for every IP, so our region-level and city-level analysis
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Table 3.4: Top 5 US states by the number of target IPs and dropzone IPs. States include: Wash-
ington (WA), New Jersey (NJ), Missouri (MO), New York (NY), Arizona (AZ), Florida (FL), New
Mexico (NM), California (CA), Illinois (IL), and Michigan (MI).
Rk. State Dropzones Pct. Rk. State Targets Pct.
1 WA 253 24.40 1 FL 506 30.67
2 NJ 188 18.13 2 NM 356 21.58
3 MO 151 14.56 3 CA 283 17.15
4 NY 112 10.80 4 IL 151 9.15
5 AZ 79 7.62 5 MI 83 5.03
(a) Distribution of dropzones by US State. (b) Distribution of targets by US State.
Figure 3.8: Distribution of dropzones and target IPs in the United states. This figure shows drop-
zone and target mainly exist in which state in the US.
show different distributions. Overall, we had 541 dropzone IPs distributed among 75 cities, and
1,003 target IPs spread over 364 cities. In the Table 3.5, we list the top 5 cities per the number of
dropzone and target IPs. We can see the US cities top the rank for the dropzone, and China and
Vietnamese cities top the ranks for targets. In Fig. 3.9(a), we note that the blue circles represent the
number of dropzone IPs in the range (0, 5] with red and green circles representing dropzone IPs
in ranges (5, 30] and (30, 120), respectively. Similarly, Fig. 3.9(b) has the blue circle representing
target IPs in the range (0, 5] with red circles as (5, 30] and green circles as (30, 50).
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Table 3.5: Top 5 cities per dropzone and target IPs. Cities in the US occupy top ranks with respect
to dropzone IPs and cities in Vietnam and China have a lot of target IPs, which demonstrate a case
similar to the countrty-level analysis.
Rk. City Dropzones Pct. Rk. City Targets Pct.
1 Seattle 113 20.89 1 Hanoi 48 4.79
2 Buffalo 49 9.06 2 Guangzhou 32 3.19
3 London 39 7.21 3 Beijing 21 2.09
4 Clifton 29 5.36 4 Rome 19 1.89
5 Kansas City 27 4.99 5 Islamabad 18 1.79
(a) Distribution of dropzones by city. (b) Distribution of targets by city.
Figure 3.9: Distribution of dropzones and target IPs throughout the world. In this figure, we can
see that a large number of dropzones are distributed in the US and Europe, and targets are mainly
distributed in Asia countries (Vietnam, China).
3.5 Network Centric Analysis
Malware specifically aimed at IoT devices tend to recruit a large number of intermediary targets
to launch attacks on high-profile targets ultimately. To do this, the malware typically identify
the intermediary targets using their IP addresses which are either mentioned in their source code
or downloaded via dropzone. Additionally, these IP addresses could be masked IP addresses,
showing only a prefix (e.g., 123.17.%d.%d). For further analysis, we performed masked IP
address mapping to IP addresses through Censys.
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Table 3.6: Composition of target IPs for masked and not-masked networks. “In Total” means the
total number of target IPs, “In Unique” means the composition of non-duplicated target IPs.
Address In Total Pct. In Unique Pct.
/24 137 0.13% 27 1.22%
/16 104,369 98.07% 1,869 84.53%
/8 776 0.73% 126 5.70%
Not-masked 1,146 1.08% 189 8.55%
Total 106,428 100.00% 2,211 100.00%
3.5.1 IP Address Mapping
In the previous sections, we analyzed the IP addresses explicitly stated in the malware code base.
For the masked IP addresses, malware typically uses functions to hide the targets from the malware
analysts and determine the targets dynamically. This functions invoked during run time to deter-
mine the remaining of the masked octets. Malware authors seldom obfuscate these functions – we,
therefore, in this section, examine the entire /16, /24, or /8 network to probe their susceptibility.
Using Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation, Table. 3.6 shows that 98.92% of the target
endpoints are masked, mapping to 126 unique /8 networks and 1,869 unique /16 networks and 27
unique /24 networks. Removing the /16 networks covered in /8 and /24 networks, we have 125 /8
networks and 435 /16 networks. These 560 networks are then searched on Censys [38] which map
to 100,793,403 active IP addresses, which also allows us to analyze their active ports.
Towards this, we made a request to Censys a research access to query all of the Censys data
through Google BigQuery. With a research access permission, we sent a query with the masked
IP addresses to map active IP addresses. We did not only collected IP addresses but also device
and active ports information for each IP addresses which exists in the dataset. Using the collected
information, we can statistically classify ports, whether they are used or not, by devices.
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Figure 3.10: Total number of devices and the number of ports that used less than 10% of devices.
The left Y-axis belongs to the number of ports (blue), the right Y-axis belongs to the total number of
devices (red), and the X-axis is device types. Device types include: DSL/cable Modem (DCM), In-
frastructure Router (IR), Network Attached Storage (NAS), Digital Video Recorder (DVR), Intel-
ligent Platform Management Interface, (IPMI) Power Distribution Unit (PDU), Kernel-based Vir-
tual Machine (KVM), Heating, ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC), Programmable Logic
Controller (PLC), Environment Monitor (EM), Industrial Control System (ICS), and Water Flow
Controller (WFC).
3.5.2 Active Ports and Suspicious Ports
As different devices use different services to operate, we clustered the IP addresses by their device
types and studied which ports were being used by the devices. Considering that open ports lead to
increased security risks, we look for ports that are necessary for a device to operate without any
misfire. Taking a conservative approach, we suggest that if a port is being used by less than 10%
of devices in a given device type, it should be closed to reduce its exposure to risk. We observe
that except for VoIP phone (over 77% of them used 5 ports), more than 75% of the devices among
all the other device types have only two or less port being used. Fig. 3.10 shows the number of
devices within a device type in log scale and the number of ports being used by less than 10% of
the devices. In this figure, the two graphs show a similar pattern. We speculate this result is due to
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Figure 3.11: Number of top 10 devices by active ports and device types.
more attack taking place on the popular devices (e.g., target devices of the Mirai consist of security
cameras, DVRs, and consumer routers [22]). Additionally, the susceptibility of high-wattage IoT
devices, such as heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC), power distribution units (PDU),
etc., can be abused by the attackers to launch large-scale coordinated attacks, e.g., power grids, as
has been demonstrated by Soltan et al. [76].
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3.5.3 Summary
The division of the endpoints by devices and then determining their exposure to the attackers
represent the chances of an endpoint being compromised. Based on our analysis we suggest the
users close the ports that aren’t necessary for the uninterrupted execution of their devices. These
endpoints need to be further examined in-depth to understand the pattern that could predict an
endpoints chances of being compromised. The suggestions could be finally narrowed, with specific
device centred recommendations, and by probing them individually by performing an offensive
penetration testing. However, in this work, we understand the data-centric landscape and put
forward the suggestions with a conservative approach, and without carrying out any offensive
analysis undermining ethics.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we analyze the≈78.2% of total responsive public IPv4 endpoints among dropzones
and their targets as extracted from IoT malware and spread across the globe from diverse perspec-
tives. First, we analyze the dropzone-target inter-relationship and their affinity. We observe that
the list of targets is shared between attackers, or are compiled by abusing shared susceptibilities.
We visualize the target areas representing dropzone locations and their size scaled by the number
of associated targets.
Our distributed analysis shows the exposure of endpoints which we correlate to the risk they pos-
sess. These endpoints need to be carefully and individually analyzed to extract patterns for pre-
dicting the chances of them being compromised.
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CHAPTER 4: IOT MALWARE NETWORK PENETRATION ANALYSIS
4.1 Motivation
In this chapter, we focus on the additional attributes contained in the IP address, leveraging the
information gathered from Shodan and Censys [3] such as active ports, vulnerabilities and organi-
zational information.
• We perform a network penetration analysis of the targets and dropzone IP addresses. To
do this, we analyze the risk associated with the IP addresses through insights gained from
Shodan.
• We analyze characteristics in IP addresses, which is active ports, vulnerabilities, and organi-
zations.
4.2 Active Ports Analysis
For each dropzone and target IP address, we issue an API query call to Shodan and Censys to
obtain a list of active ports. We extracted 5,745 active ports from 716 of the 877 dropzone IPs
and 1,114 active ports from 129 of 189 the non-masked target IPs. It is to be noted that malware
authors also mask the octets of the target IP addresses, which they determine dynamically during
execution. In this analysis, we only use the IP the not masked addresses.
Each port number is typically associated with a computer or network service, such as port 80 for
HTTP traffic. In Table. 4.1 and Table. 4.2, we list the top 10 active ports among dropzone IPs and
target IPs, respectively. As shown in both tables, the largest portion of active ports is common
services like SSH (port 22), HTTP (port 80), and HTTPS (port 443). However, we would like to
point out some of the other active ports among target IPs appearing in Table. 4.2, like the SUN
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Table 4.1: Top 10 active ports in dropzone IPs. The most of ports are used for general purposes.
Rk. Port Count Pct. Service Description
1 22 641 32.57% SSH The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
2 80 600 30.49% HTTP World Wide Web HTTP
3 443 350 17.78% HTTPS HTTP protocol over TLS/SSL
4 25 276 14.02% SMTP Simple Mail Transfer
5 21 275 13.97% FTP File Transfer Protocol [Control]
6 3306 224 11.38% MySQL MySQL database system
7 53 187 9.50% DNS Domain Name Server
8 110 175 8.89% POP3 Post Office Protocol - Version 3
9 143 171 8.69% IMAP Internet Message Access Protocol
10 993 165 8.38% IMAPS IMAP over TLS protocol
Table 4.2: Top 10 active ports in target IPs. With the exception of a few, most shown ports are used
for common services.
Rk. Port Count Pct. Service Description
1 80 111 17.85% HTTP World Wide Web HTTP
2 22 106 17.04% SSH The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
3 443 67 10.77% HTTPS HTTP protocol over TLS/SSL
4 21 51 8.20% FTP File Transfer Protocol [Control]
5 25 49 7.88% SMTP Simple Mail Transfer
6 3306 40 6.43% MySQL MySQL database system
7 53 29 4.66% DNS Domain Name Server
8 8080 29 4.66% HTTP-alt HTTP Alternate (see port 80)
9 111 28 4.50% SunRPC SUN Remote Procedure Call
10 123 26 4.18% NTP Network Time Protocol
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) on port 111 and the Network Time Protocol (NTP) on port 123.
Port 111. is a well-known port used by the Port Mapper service over the TCP and UDP proto-
cols [69], which essentially is a port lookup service for the Open Network Computing Remote
Procedure Call (ONC RPC) system designed by Sun Microsystems in the 1980s for their Network
File System [10]. As described in RFC 1833 [69], the port numbers for RPC programs and ser-
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vices are determined dynamically on startup so if a client wishes to make ONC RPC calls they
will query the Port Mapper on port 111 to obtain the appropriate RPC service port. Reported by
L3 Communications in August of 2015 [1], the Port Mapper service became a new attack vector
for adversaries seeking to amplify their DDoS attacks. This has to due to the fact that when Port
Mapper is queried, the response size varies significantly depending on which RPC services are
available on the host. In their examples, L3 Communications show that a 68-byte query results
in a 486-byte response for an amplification factor of 7.1x with responses as large as 1,930 bytes
for amplification of 28.4x. If adversaries “spoof” the victim’s source IP for these UDP packets
directed towards several vulnerable devices with port 111 open, they will ultimately be redirected
back en masse towards the victim (i.e., a UDP flood attack).
Port 123. is reserved for the Network Time Protocol (NTP), which was proposed in 1985 by D.L.
Mills [37] to synchronize network clocks using a set of distributed clients and servers. Strangely
enough, the content delivery network (CDN) and DDoS mitigation company called CloudFlare
predicted in late 2013 that the NTP protocol could possibly be abused in DDoS amplification
attacks [43]. This prediction came true in early 2014 [47] because much like the exploit for the
Port Mapper service described above, NTP is also UDP-based and can be prone to “IP spoofing”
for DDoS attacks. As emphasized in [80], exploiting NTP has a great potential for amplification
attacks due to the “monlist” command that a typical attacker sends to an NTP server. The “monlist”
command returns the last 600 IP addresses previously synchronized with the NTP server which is
spread over 30 separate UDP packets, each of which is 448 bytes. The overall size varies depending
on the server, but the data volume is almost 1,000x larger than the packet originally sent by the
attacker.
30
4.3 Vulnerabilities Analysis
We then explore the susceptibility of IP addresses. In particular, we examine the vulnerabilities
present in IP addresses. Towards this, we analyze the use of vulnerable services running on end-
points. For the vulnerable endpoints, we gather the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
identifier, e.g., “CVE-2017-15906”. CVE, maintained by MITRE [29], which standardizes security
vulnerabilities using their own naming schemes.
We analyze the vulnerabilities in the dropzones towards understanding their dynamics. Table. 4.3
depicts the top six vulnerabilities by the number of dropzone IPs. We further analyze the vulnera-
bilities to understand the root cause behind their existence. We found that CVE-2017-15906 is the
most frequent vulnerability which is related to 203 dropzone IPs and 448 instances of malware.
According to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [9], CVE-2017-15906 is a “medium”
severity vulnerability where versions of OpenSSH before 7.6 do not properly prevent write op-
erations in readonly mode. This allows attackers to create several zero-length files which could
possibly exhaust disk space. For the second most common CVE among the dropzones (i.e., CVE-
2014-1692), the NVD reports the severity of this vulnerability as “high” since it might allow remote
attackers to launch a DoS through memory corruption due to uninitialized data structures from the
hash buffer function in OpenSSH. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to launch a denial of
service (e.g., memory corruption or disk saturation) of target devices. These vulnerabilities do
not say much about the dropzones. Additionally, we observe that 98.61% of dropzone IPs, which
have the vulnerability of CVE-2014-1692, also possess at least one of the vulnerabilities associ-
ated with unauthorized authentication resulting in access to the device; this is, remote unauthorized
authentication attempts can be an indicator of a potential dropzone.
CVE-2016-0777, CVE-2012-0814, and CVE-2010-4478 are vulnerabilities that allow an attacker
to obtain access permission on target devices by stealing sensitive information; (e.g., private key
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Table 4.3: Top 6 Vulnerabilities by the number of dropzone IPs. Note that the dropzones use
vulnerable version of OpenSSH.
Vulnerability IP Malware Description
CVE-2017-15906 203 448 OpenSSH/DDoS
CVE-2014-1692 142 320 OpenSSH/DDoS
CVE-2016-0777 142 325 OpenSSH/Private Key leakage
CVE-2012-0814 140 307 Cross-privilege boundaries/OpenSSH
CVE-2011-4327 140 307 OpenSSH/Authentication leakage
CVE-2010-4478 140 307 OpenSSH/Authentication override
or authorized key), bypassing the authentication and crossing privilege boundaries. Additionally,
CVE-2011-4237 enables remote attackers to make an unauthorized modification to the kist of
authenticated keys by injecting arbitrary HTTP header. We observe that 17.04% of dropzone IP
addresses (i.e., 144) have at least one of these four vulnerabilities which provides a large attack
surface to the attackers. This is, these vulnerabilities provide a broad range of attack surface that
can be abused by attackers to compromise the devices, then act as dropzones. Moreover, some of
the dropzones use the default credentials making the devices an attractive target.
4.4 IP-Owning Organizations Analysis
We then analyze the organizations that own the given IP space, e.g., Starhub Mobile. In Fig. 4.1 we
have plots for the CDF between the IP-owning organizations and their: number of dropzone IPs,
number of malware instances, and number of target IPs they point to. A breakdown of the top 10
IP-owning organizations is presented in Table. 4.4. Note that for each organization, there is clearly
a relationship between the number of dropzone IPs and the number of malware instances they are
associated with. However, there are abnormal cases in our dataset, such as Cogeco Peer 1 (Canada)
and MAROSNET Telecommunication Company LLC (Russia) who have only 1 dropzone IP but
point to 2,214 and 2,178 target IPs, respectively. In contrast, HOSTKEY (that operates in the
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Figure 4.1: Organization v. the number of dropzone IP, malware and target IP. The similarity in
the CDFs is because there is a high probability that the organization that includes more malware
will contain more dropzone and target, except in a few cases (i.e., where one dropzone refers to
thousands of targets, or one dropzone refers to only one target).
Netherlands and Russia [6]) has only 2 dropzone IPs that are associated with 2 target IPs and 2
instances of malware.
Interestingly enough, the locations of these organizations coincide with the heatmap of US States
presented in Fig. 3.8(a) which illustrates the highest distribution of dropzones. For example, the
organization with the greatest number of dropzone IPs according to our data is Wowrack.com,
which is a cloud service provider with headquarter offices in Seattle, Washington [14]. In addition
to its flagship data center in Seattle, Wowrack operates eight other data centers in multiple cities
across the United States and Southeast Asia. As reported by AbuseIPDB [2], Wowrack.com IPs
have received several complaints of abusive activity from multiple sources. The Canadian Internet
Registration Authority (CIRA) has also urged IT, administrators, to block domains originating
from Wowrack.com (e.g., ns6.wowrack.com) because they are associated with the Mirai IoT
botnet [85].
Referring to Fig. 3.8(a) again, you will notice that New York State contains a high number of
dropzones--which is most likely caused by two organizations from Table. 4.4 that have data centers
in the city of Buffalo, NY (Wowrack.com and ColoCrossing [5]). Also highlighted in red is the
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Table 4.4: Top 10 organizations by the number of their dropzone IPs. In this table, most organiza-
tions increase linearly in the number of dropzone, malware, and target.
Rk. Dropzone IPs Target IPs Malware Organization
1 46 16,586 126 Wowrack.com
2 36 19,878 114 Aruba S.p.A
3 22 10,282 62 Choopa LLC
4 16 3,816 47 DigitalOcean LLC
5 16 3,330 29 ColoCrossing
6 13 8,373 38 NForce Entertainment B.V.
7 11 1,701 24 Hydra Communications Ltd
8 9 4,354 35 Ad Net Market Media Srl
9 9 388 17 Wholesale Data Center LLC
10 6 1,220 8 Input Output Flood LLC
state of Arizona, which is the home of Input Output Flood LLC [7] (ranked 10th for organizations
with several dropzones).
We cannot say for certain why these organizations contain the most dropzone IPs in our dataset;
we can only surmise that they are more tolerant when it comes to harboring customers who engage
in “malicious” activities. For example, the organization with the 3rd-highest number of dropzones
in our dataset is Choopa LLC. With their primary Point of Presence (POP) in the State of New
Jersey [4], you can clearly see that this affects the heatmap (colored dark-red) shown in Fig. 3.8(a).
While online public reviews may not be the most-trustworthy source [79], the low ratings from the
Google reviews of Choopa LLC put them in a negative light when several people post complaints
such as the following:
Why is this company still operating?! Yes, maybe it’s not them trying to hack into my email, but they let
user do it!!!! Crooks!! --M. Alther
Lots of SSH attacks coming from their network. Reported via blocklist.de multiple times and I still am
seeing scans. --C. Simmons
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You guys need to pick your customers better...Our e-commerce site is getting a lot of fraud orders coming
from your IP. I know its not your fault that customers are using your servers for illegal activities. But
do understand they ruining your reputation as a company. --W. Struggle
4.5 Summary
We observe that while port 80 and 22 are the most widely used across endpoints, we see the
usage of port 111 and port 123 by the target IP addresses. Considering the possibility of the
two ports being an entry point for an attacker, the usage should be limited. We also observe
that the low presence of vulnerable services by dropzone IP addresses. The vulnerabilities in
the dropzones reflect that the attackers override their authentication status and then utilize the
OpenSSH vulnerabilities to gain access to the device. Our analysis also sheds light on the tolerance
of organizations towards the endpoints with malicious intent. The tug of war between the profit and
the loss of trust among the users (prospective domain buyers) deserve the focus of the community.
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CHAPTER 5: UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS AND
INTERDEPENDENCIES IN IOT BOTNETS1
5.1 Background
To address IoT security, malware behavior analysis methods are employed, including dynamic
and static analysis. Dynamic analysis is concerned with understanding malware by inspecting
run-time artifacts of IoT executables (typically running in a restricted environment; e.g., sandbox,
virtual machine), in search of malicious behaviors. Despite many advantages, dynamic analysis has
several drawbacks. For example, recent malware families have been shown to utilize randomized
behaviors that make analysis difficult. Evading dynamic analysis techniques is yet another major
shortcoming, often demonstrated by inserting fake code fragments, separate processes, etc. [46].
Dynamic analysis is also time-consuming since a successful analysis needs the malware to run
for a significant amount of time before such a dynamic behavior is exposed. Static analysis, on
the other hand, is concerned with analyzing the contents and the structure of the executables.
Through this analysis, we can find features of malware such as execution-flow as well as the
strings without having to execute the binaries [15, 19, 20], making this approach safer and faster
than dynamic analysis [49], although subjecting to static analysis circumvention techniques, such
as code obfuscation [33, 61], typically addressed with de-obfuscators.
Static Analysis. In this section, we employ static analysis for extracting residual strings in the
IoT malware binaries, and use those strings as an analysis space from which we obtain endpoints,
classified as targets and dropzones. In static analysis, reverse-engineering tools are utilized to
1This content was reproduced from the following article: J. Choi, A. Abusnaina, A. Anwar, A. Wang, S. Chen, D.
Nyang and A. Mohaisen, “Honor Among Thieves: Towards Understanding the Dynamics and Interdependencies in
IoT Botnets”. IEEE Conference on Dependable and Secure Computing, IDSC, pp. 1-8, Hangzhou, China, 2019. The
copyright form for this article is included in the appendix.
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understand circumvention methods in use by the adversary, and to extract static artifacts, such as
strings, function calls, structures (such as control flow graph), etc. However, techniques such as
packing or obfuscation can be used to avoid static analysis or to increase the effort and resources
required for conducting it. In a separate project, we developed various in-house heuristics and tools
to address obfuscation, and to obtain faithful strings representation for IoT malware, which we use
in our analysis in this research. The results of our analysis are further in subsection, IoT Malware
Static Analysis.
Dropzones and Targets. IP addresses extracted from the malware binary through static analysis
are classified into two categories. If the IP address was used with wget, tftp, get, or post,
which are commands used to send files such as script, malware binary, etc., we mark the remote
location of this IP address as a dropzone. The remaining IP addresses that are not used with
these commands are called targets, which are the IP addresses attacked by the malware (confirmed
through the manual inspection). The target IP addresses consist of 16-bit masked addresses and
static IP addresses. Only the static IP addresses are used in our analysis.
5.2 Motivation
• We conduct string static analysis over IoT malware binaries to extract communicated and
referred IP addresses, and keywords reflecting the malware behavior.
• We conduct a spatial distribution analysis on the extracted dropzones and targets, where
region dependencies within the extracted addresses are shown.
• We identify the interdependent dropzone IP addresses, by extracting dropzones “chains”,
capturing the dynamics between different botnets and other malicious infrastructure. We
propose a centrality-based modality of analysis (and defense) to limit the propagation and
impact of malware based on those dynamics.
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Table 5.1: The distribution of malware families in the dataset.
Family Count Percentage
Gafgyt 4,264 88.76%
Mirai 507 10.55%
Tsunami 29 0.60%
Singleton 2 0.04%
Pilkah 1 0.02%
Sambashell 1 0.02%
Total 4,804 100%
5.3 Dataset
In this research, we relied on a dataset of IoT malicious binaries obtained from CyberIOCs [32].
The binaries are recent, and consist of samples that were collected in the CyberIOCs feed in the
period of January 2018 to late January of 2019.
Dataset Creation. Our IoT dataset is a set of 4,804 malware samples, randomly selected from
CyberIOCs [32]. We reverse-engineered the samples using Radare2 [11], a reverse engineering
framework that provides various capabilities including disassembly, which we use for the IoT
malware samples.
IoT Malware Family. To better understand the collected samples, we uploaded the samples to
VirusTotal [34] and gathered the scanning results corresponding to each sample. Then, we used
AVClass [71] to match the samples with their corresponding IoT malware families. Table 5.1 shows
the distribution of malware families in the dataset; as shown Gafgyt and Mirai represent the ma-
jority of our dataset, 99.31%.
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5.4 IoT Malware Static Analysis
We reverse-engineered the malware binaries to extract the IP addresses communicated with or re-
ferred by the malicious binaries. To scale up the analysis, we automate the process using Radare2.
We analyzed the strings in the entry point and the function calls to extract the IP addresses, where
two types of IP addresses can be extracted: (1) C2 servers communicated by the malware for
instructions, such as targets list, malware binaries execution, etc. Such IP addresses can be iden-
tified by command keywords, namely wget, tftp, post, and get. These IP addresses are
designated as dropzone IP addresses. (2) IP addresses referred by the malware, e.g., the malware
communicates with the IP address to infiltrate where successful infiltration causes propagation of
the malware, recruiting an additional bot. These IP addresses are called target IPs.
Dropzone. Controlled by the attackers, a dropzone is a remote location often storing the malware
binaries and infection capabilities. Upon gaining access to a device, a malware instance accesses
the dropzone, via a dropzone IP address, to download the file on the host device. The mentioned
remote addresses are our artifacts of interest, and we study relationships between different drop-
zones’ IP addresses.
Target. Upon successfully infecting a device, the malware uses the infected host to propagate the
infection by setting a list of IP addresses to infect in the future. We refer to these IP addresses as
target IP addresses.
We collected the dropzones and target IPs from each IoT malware sample, to be analyzed in the
next sections. Figure 5.1 shows a general structure of the malware-IP relationship.
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Figure 5.1: General structure of the malware-IP relationship. Malicious binaries are obtained from
the remote dropzone and are accessible using wget, GET, etc.
5.5 IP Addresses Analysis
To better understand the relationship between the dropzones, we start by analyzing the IP ad-
dresses. In our dataset, we observed 1,457 unique dropzone IP addresses and only 294 unique tar-
get IP addresses. Moreover, there were 1,018 unique 16-bit masked target IP addresses. These IP
addresses are generated at run-time using a random number generator, particularly, the SRAND C
library, or by looping over all possible IP addresses within the specified network. Typically, masked
IP addresses are used to infect and compromise vulnerable IoT devices within a network. Figure 5.2
shows the distribution of the dropzones, unique targets, and masked targets. Notice that most of
the dropzones are located in the US and Europe. However, most of the masked targets are located
in Southeast Asia, Brazil and the Eastern Coast of the US.
Unique Target IP Addresses. Our analysis focuses on the unique target IP addresses referred to
in the IoT malware. These addresses are more meaningful than the masked IP addresses as they
are hard-coded within the malware. In the dataset, we extracted 294 unique target IP addresses. In
which, 134 of the addresses are dropzones of other malware samples in our dataset. We scanned the
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Figure 5.2: The distribution of the extracted components worldwide. Here, the target refers to the
location of the unique target IP address extracted from the string analysis of the IoT malware. The
masked target is represented by its center. To estimate the locations of the masked target area, we
convert the masked part to zeros (i.e., 183.229.%d.%d to 183.229.0.0).
Table 5.2: The distribution of the unique target IP addresses.
Type Count Percentage
Dropzone 134 45.58%
Malicious 129 43.88%
Benign 31 10.54%
Total 294 100%
remaining IP addresses using VirusTotal, where 129 of them were identified as malicious. These
malicious IP addresses might be potential dropzones not existing in our dataset, or infrastructure
utilized by other malactors. In addition, the benign IP addresses might be dropzones not yet dis-
covered by VirusTotal, or DDoS attacks targets, which is more plausible given that the dataset is
new, and blacklists against which our IP addresses were scanned take time to populate with the
malicious addresses. Table 5.2 shows the distribution of the unique target IP addresses.
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Table 5.3: Organization distribution of the benign target IPs.
Organization Type
Amateur Radio Digital Comm. Nonprofit
Apple Inc. Technology
Bank of America, N.A. Financial
Ford Motor Company Automaker
Hewlett Packard Enterprise Technology
Lockheed Martin Corporation Aerospace/Defense
University of Michigan Academic
Information Center Locality
AFRINIC Africa
APNIC Asia Pacific
DoD NIC USA
RIPE NCC Europe
Targeted Organizations. We scanned the benign IP addresses extracted from the IoT malware (31
addresses) and gathered the organizations they belong to. We found that the IP addresses belong to
companies such as Apple, Bank of America, Ford, etc. Moreover, one IP address belonged to the
University of Michigan, while some IP addresses belonged to endpoints in different information
centers. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of the benign target IP addresses over organizations and
information centers, highlighting a wide distribution.
Dropzones Malware Family. Dropzones are remote locations storing malware binaries, among
other artifacts by the adversary. When a new device is infected, it will communicate with the
dropzone to obtain the malicious binaries, along with the infection capabilities, which vary for
each family. We analyze the malware family of each dropzone. Table 5.4 shows the distribution of
the dropzone malware families, with Gafgyt malware binaries existing in 89.63% of the dropzones,
followed by Mirai (10.57%). In addition, we found that different families of malware binaries
contained the same dropzone. In other words, some dropzones contain more than one family
binaries; Table 5.5 shows the distribution of the malware families per dropzone. We notice that
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Table 5.4: The distribution of dropzone malware families.
Family # Dropzones % Dropzones
Gafgyt 1,306 89.63%
Mirai 154 10.57%
Tsunami 14 0.96%
Singleton 2 0.14%
Pilkah 1 0.07%
Sambashell 1 0.07%
Total 1,457 100%
Table 5.5: Malware families distribution per dropzone.
# Families # Dropzones % Dropzones
1 1,437 98.63%
2 19 1.30%
3 1 0.07%
Total 1,457 100%
one dropzone contains the malicious binaries of Gafgyt, Mirai and Tsunami families, highlighting
the shared infrastructure.
Dropzones Distribution. Dropzones have spatial localities in their distribution, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.2. Moreover, Figure 5.3 shows a heatmap of the country distribution of the dropzones, where
the United States, Netherlands, Denmark, Romania, and Russia are hosting 77.82% of the drop-
zones. Table 5.6 shows the top dropzones hosting countries, highlighting—not surprisingly—a
heavy-tailed distribution.
To this end, we have analyzed the IP addresses as independent entities. However, our static analysis
shows that different IP addresses are communicating and being referred by each other. As such, it
is important to study the relationship between them, and among dropzones in particular.
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Figure 5.3: The distribution of dropzones over the countries. The color shade reflects the number
of dropzones within the country, where darker shade represents more dropzones.
Table 5.6: The distribution of the dropzones over countries.
Country # Dropzones % Dropzones
United States 553 37.95%
Netherlands 283 19.42%
Denmark 113 7.75%
Romania 103 7.07%
Russia 82 5.63%
Others 323 22.18%
5.6 Malware-Target Relationship
The IP addresses referred by malicious binaries are the next targets of the malware for either infec-
tion or attack. The malware samples communicate with a target to achieve one of the following:
• Infection. Malware search for vulnerable devices and compromise them, leading to a new
bot. Afterward, malicious binaries with infection capabilities are downloaded from the re-
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mote dropzone to the infected host. The IP address is typically generated at run-time and
referred to in the code as the masked IP address.
• Attack. After infecting a large number of bots, malware samples attack the target by flooding
its servers or network infrastructure with packets, resulting in a DDoS attack. Typically,
these IP addresses are not masked as the bot should be aware of the exact target IP address
prior to the DDoS attack.
• Communication. A malware sample might communicate with an infected bot for many
reasons, e.g., checking its status, updating/pushing files, sending a command message, etc.
The communication is very important for the malware to assess the resources and coordinate
for future attacks.
Limitation. Static analysis is useful to understand the behavior without the need to run the ma-
licious binaries. In the malicious binaries, we observe keywords such as Infect, wget, post,
push, http, and get. These keywords indicate the relationship between the malware and the
targets. However, besides wget, it is hard to match the exact IP address to a certain behavior
if more than one keyword is used. Therefore, we assume that all IP addresses might contain the
behaviors provided by the keywords associated with them.
5.7 Dropzones Chains
In section IP Addresses Analysis, we classified the IP addresses and found that 134 target IP
addresses are also dropzones existing in our dataset. A malware may control a dropzone, and
targets another dropzone; we refer to this phenomenon as dropzones chain. Figure 5.4 shows the
general structure of a dropzones chain of length two. Understanding the chains is important, as
malware may access a dropzone to distribute and update its binaries on other dropzones. Moreover,
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Figure 5.4: Structure of the dropzones chain of length two, where malware access dropzone, and
targets another dropzone.
a dropzone may control several dropzones, forwarding commands and managing attacks. Using
static analysis alone is not sufficient to understand the exact role of each dropzone within the chain.
However, the behavior of the chain is toward propagating information, which plays a major role
in the success of the malicious attacks. Figure 5.5 shows the dropzone to dropzone chain links
visualization worldwide. Notice that some dropzones are directly linked to several dropzones.
Chains Length. We extracted 56 possible chains from our dataset. The majority of the dropzones
(62.5%) are of length 2, and most of the dropzones are of a length less than 10 (96.43%). How-
ever, the longest chain has 42 dropzones. Table 5.7 shows the distribution of the dropzones chains
length. We observe that centralization exists in chains with a high number of dropzones. All of the
extracted chains belong to the Gafgyt and Mirai families. We found one Mirai chain of length 2
and 52 Gafgyt chains. However, there were 3 chains containing both Mirai and Gafgyt dropzones.
One possible explanation for such a characteristic is that Mirai is considered an evolution of the
Gafgyt malware family [22, 54].
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Figure 5.5: Dropzone to dropzone links visualization. Here, a remote location may be a dropzone
of several dropzones. Links connect the location of the dropzone with the location of the targeted
dropzone.
Table 5.7: The distribution of the dropzones chains length.
Chain Length Count
2 35
3 10
4 5
6 3
8 1
17 1
42 1
Total 56
Chains Region Distribution. Dropzones within the chain have locality characteristics. Figure 5.6
shows the country distribution of the links within the chains. Notice that a darker shade indicates
more dropzones within the chain are from the specified country. Table 5.8 shows the top five coun-
tries hosting dropzones within chains. Notice that the countries are the same as Table 5.6. It can be
seen that 24.95% of the United States dropzones are within chains, with an overall 20.66% of the
dropzones are within chains. However, the chains are depending on the collected dataset, mean-
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Figure 5.6: Country level distribution of the dropzones within the chains. Color shade indicates
the number of dropzones within the country. Here, link connect the country of the dropzone with
the country of the targeted dropzone.
Table 5.8: The distribution of the chains dropzones over countries. Here, # Dropzones is the
number of dropzones within the chain, whereas, % Dropzones is the percentage of the dropzones
within the country that is within a chain.
Country # Dropzones % Dropzones
United States 138 24.95%
Netherlands 71 25.09%
Romania 27 26.21%
Denmark 16 14.16%
Russia 14 17.07%
Others 35 10.83%
Total 301 20.66%
ing that the remaining dropzones (79.34%) may be part of chains not observed by the collected
samples.
Chains Centrality. A common observation we make is that large chains usually have one or a
few central dropzones. For instance, one remote location is a dropzone of a large number of other
dropzones. This indicates the importance of that dropzone for the malware to successfully operate.
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Removing or monitoring the central dropzones highly affects the malicious operation of various
samples, and improving our understanding of the malware behavior/defense. To find central drop-
zones, we use graph characteristics, namely the centralities such as the degree-, betweenness-,
closeness-, and eigenvector-centrality. In our experiment, we found degree-centrality is the most
effective way to find the essential nodes of the dropzone chain. We utilize the closeness, be-
tweenness, and eigenvector centrality to remove the center dropzone in the chain, but these factors
remove another node and reduce only two to five edges. Figure 5.7 shows the effect of remov-
ing the central dropzone from the chain. Here, the chain contains 42 dropzones, connected by 44
edges (links), with a central remote location acting as a dropzone for 34 dropzones. In this fig-
ure, a directed edge indicates that a remote location is a dropzone (start of the arrow) to another
dropzone (end of the arrow). Therefore, removing the central dropzone decrease the number of
edges from 44 to 10 (77.27% decrease). Removing the dropzone from the network can be done by
the Internet Service Provider (ISP), as the dropzones have static IP addresses, with known home
ISPs. Moreover, another feasible option is to monitor the traffic from and to the central dropzone
of each chain, as monitoring all bots or dropzones might not be possible. In a related analysis, we
show that dropzones are accessed to obtain malicious binaries, infection capabilities, and attacks
coordinating. Therefore, monitoring the traffic of the central dropzone gives an overview of the
malware behavior as it acts as a dropzone for a large number of dropzones and samples.
5.8 Summary
In this work, we analyzed IoT malware binaries to understand the dependencies and relationships
among malware. We conduct static analysis to extract the addresses communicated to or referred
by the malware. Among a large number of endpoints (dropzones and targets) in static malware
artifacts, we identified dependencies between dropzones, in which we coin the dropzones chain.
We identified 56 unique chains and unveiled interactions among Gafgyt and Mirai families. Further
49
(a) Before (b) After
Figure 5.7: The effect of removing the central dropzone over the chain. Fig. 5.7(a) is the chain
before the removal of the dropzone, and Fig. 5.7(b) is the same chain after the removal of the
dropzone. Notice that most dropzones became disconnected and isolated, thus removed from the
chain.
analysis showed the existence of centralization within chains with higher node counts, where a
central dropzone communicates with several dropzones in a decentralized fashion.
We note that all the analysis previously done depends on the collected dataset. By reverse-
engineering the IoT malicious binaries and conducting string static analysis, it has been shown
that some IP addresses are specified within the code prior to the execution of the program. These
IP addresses are within two groups, dropzones, and targets.
Dropzone-Target Relationship. A remote location may be used as a dropzone for a set of drop-
zone targets. This indicates a relationship between the dropzones. The nature and role of the
relationship may vary, as malware may use a master dropzone to update the binaries of a set of lo-
cal dropzones or control the dropzones in order to coordinate future attacks or large area infections.
In addition, large chains are usually centralized, where there is one or a few central dropzones act-
ing as a dropzone for most of the chain dropzones. Analyzing the traffic of the central dropzones
may help us understand the behavior of the malware, while shutting down the central dropzone
highly affects the operation of the malware, especially at early stages. This can be done with the
coordination with ISPs as the dropzone IP is known. Shutting down the central dropzone cuts the
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communication between it and other dropzones, disrupting the functionalities in section Malware-
Target Relationship.
Families Intersection. It has been observed that one remote location may act as a dropzone
for multiple IoT malicious families. In the dataset, this relationship exists within Gafgyt, Mirai,
and Tsunami. Researchers reported a new type of IoT threat known as KTN-RM or Remaiten
which targets IoT devices by combining the capabilities of Linux malware known as Tsunami,
Gafgyt [16, 30]. In addition, it has been reported that Mirai is an evolution of Bashlite malware,
including Gafgyt [22,54]. Our analysis, although not concerned with the capabilities, hint on such
an evolution from an infrastructure standpoint.
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CHAPTER 6: OPTIMIZATION FOR DEFENSE
We analyze the IoT malware ecosystem and the interdependencies of IoT botnets. In the IoT
malware ecosystem, we aim to inter-relationship between dropzones and targets, geographical
distributions, and network centric analysis. Also, we study interdependencies and dynamics in IoT
botnets. Based on this analysis, we define a chain that relationships among the malware dropzones.
Through these studies, we look at methods to mitigate the threat of IoT malware in countries.
We extract the malicious IP addresses from IoT malware through static analysis. Based on this,
we analyze the open ports of the IP addresses targeted by IoT malware. Through this, the device
can be distinguished from the port that is mainly used and the port that is not. If unused ports are
opened, an IoT device that is poorly managed is likely to be an attacker. Therefore, we suggest
blocking the ports that are not used for the main role in the devices. Moreover, similarly, we study
which ports affect country-level through this analysis.
In this work, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a method to mitigate the threat in the IoT malware endpoints. It is based on the
open ports by the countries.
• We inspect open ports in the target IP addresses, we list the open ports and their numbers,
and vulnerabilities.
• We analyze countries ratios in each open ports. In this analysis, we provide insight into
strategy for block open ports.
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Table 6.1: Suspicious ports in the target IP addresses open ports list.
25 2323 1433 8888 502
445 3306 110 143 993
47808 995 1911 1521 5432
102 21 22 8080 53
23 587 7547 20000 443
6.1 Open Ports Distribution
In this section, we analyze the open ports distribution at the country-level. There are vulnerable
ports and we show the distribution for those ports over the countries. We inspect the reason why
they show different patterns. We pick the ports from the previous analysis, attack exposure. We
select ports that used each device under 1%, which is considered they are not the main role for the
function. In the Table 6.1, we choose 25 ports to analyze the method for the mitigation of threats.
These open ports exist in the IP addresses and they are not mainly used.
In the Table 6.2, we list the open port numbers, descriptions, number of vulnerabilities, and count of
open ports, which is essential when using the Internet, occupy a large portion. e.g., 443 (HTTPS),
22 (SSH), 8080 (HTTP alternative), 21 (FTP), etc.
In case port 7547, it is associated with TR-069, which is an application layer protocol for remote
management of end-user devices. This port used by modems, gateways, routers VoIP phones,
and set-top boxes. CVE-2016-10372 is one of vulnerability related to this port, allows remote
attackers to execute arbitrary commands, it is recommended to block or filter it at the NAT router/-
gateway [58, 77]. In the Figure 6.1, US account for 31% of the total number of 7547 port.
For port 8888, this port is used in the alternative of HTTP port. This port has a 6 of known vulnera-
bilities (CVE-2014-2967, CVE-2018-6892, CVE-2018-7886, CVE-2019-7678, CVE-2019-7677,
and CVE-2019-7676). For Autodesk VRED programs that have a vulnerability (CVE-2014-2967)
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Table 6.2: Open ports in the countries sort by the number of CVE vulnerabilities. TSAP stands
for Transport Service Access Point protocol, DNP stands for Distributed Network Protocol for
SCADA networks, TR-069 stands for application layer protocol for remote management of end-
user devices, BACnet stands for Building Automation and Control Networks, and MTP stands for
Starlight Networks Multimedia Transport Protocol.
Port CVE-Vulnerabilities Count Describe
102 12 3,166 TSAP
22 12 10,574,166 SSH
443 12 32,029,435 HTTPS
502 8 16,982 Modbus Appication protocol
53 8 5,545,751 DNS
23 7 2,382,294 Telnet
8080 7 8,850,356 HTTP (Alternative)
25 6 3,895,884 SMTP
8888 6 2,717,164 althttpd
21 5 7,469,501 FTP
20000 5 168 DNP
110 3 2,877,341 POP3
3306 2 2,961,005 MYSQL
143 2 2,640,195 IMAP
445 2 1,549,161 Microsoft-DS
1433 2 522,370 MSSQL
5432 1 428,575 PostgreSQL
1521 1 58,945 Oracle
2323 1 267,742 Applications
7547 1 15,147,494 TR-069
587 0 2,932,974 SMTP
47808 0 10,202 BACNET
995 0 2,550,497 POP3 over TLS/SSL
993 0 2,631,357 IMAP overTLS/SSL
1911 0 16,900 MTP
that could allow unauthorized remote code execution, this port allows an attacker to remotely
access it. Importing Python’s library, an attacker can execute an attacker’s command with the
privileges the program is running on. From the Figure 6.2, we can see that this port is mainly
distributed in East Asia countries, Taiwan and China, 29.36% and 26.05%, respectively.
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Figure 6.1: Port 7547 distribution by the countries. United States have most portion in the dataset.
Port 1433 uses for the Microsoft SQL Server. This port has two vulnerabilities, CVE-2002-
1123 and CVE-2014-4684. CVE-2002-1123 is a buffer overflow in the authentication function
for MSSQL server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 allows remote attackers
to execute arbitrary code through this port. CVE-2014-4684 also allows remote authenticated
users to gain privileges with port 1433. This vulnerability exists in the database server in Siemens
SIMATIC WinCC before 7.3 version. We can see the distribution of the port 1433 by the countries
in Figure 6.3. Poland has 26.72% of the total number of port 1433, and China has 21.1% of it.
6.2 Mitigation for Defense
The defense method we propose through this analysis is as follows. It is to analyze the ports that
are more important and account for each country, and block those ports. To do this, a detailed
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Figure 6.2: Port 8888 distribution by the countries. Taiwan and China have a lot of number of
ports.
analysis of the network devices used in each country is necessary. In particular, it is necessary to
analyze the ports that are open in network devices. Through this, it is possible to distinguish a
port used for the main purpose of a device and a port that is not. In this research, we focused on
ports that are not used mainly and analyzed how those ports are distributed by country. In addition,
it should be reflected in the policy of filtering or blocking ports according to the vulnerabilities
revealed by ports. For example, in the case of port 7547, it has one identified vulnerability, and it
can be seen that it is mainly distributed in the UK, Russia, and the like. Even though there is only
one vulnerability, the vulnerability should be managed more intensively in a country or enterprise
because a remote attacker can execute arbitrary commands. Not only port 7547, but also other ports
have vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit and execute remote commands or gain privilege with
unauthenticated login. This is the reason why we focus on the mitigation method and block the
ports.
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Figure 6.3: Port 1433 distribution by the countries. Poland and China have most of the ports.
6.3 Summary
Using our research results, we can select ports that are likely to utilize for the attack. Also, we
analyzed the open ports distributed by country and vulnerabilities of each port. Through this
analysis, we can more aggressively filter and block ports by country to prevent the spread and
attack by IoT malware. If we apply the proposed method, mitigation strategies through these port
blocks, such as router/gateway, can be used by companies in each country, network, and security
within limited resources for defense purpose.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
7.1 Limitation
Our study is not without limitations. The key shortcomings in our work have to do with the IP
address-Geolocation mapping, Obfuscated malware binary, dataset and target behavior, as seen
from the static analysis artifacts. In this section, discuss to limitations of this research. We utilize
IP addresses locations to discover affinities and dynamics among IoT malware endpoints. Toward
this, we use Ultratools [13] and Censys services [3]. However, they provide geolocation based on
the mapping service. Also, most of malware binaries are obfuscated to avoid detection and protect
their code from the reverse-engineering. This makes it harder to analyze IoT malware binaries.
7.1.1 Accuracy of IP addresses-Geolocation Mapping
Ultratools derive the country information of an IP address from Regional Internet Registries (RIRs)
and other locational data. RIR is an organization that manages the allocation and registration of
IP addresses and autonomous system numbers within a region of the world. Some ISPs may
contribute information to databases to help geolocation services. They use statistical formulas and
analytical tools and analyze the data provided by online users [13, 35]. However, the location of
IP addresses may be limited. Even if users utilize VPN, proxy, they can change the IP address. If
we use a genuine IP address, it is difficult to analyze the location of the endpoint more precisely
because it depends on the accuracy of a country, state, and city. We analyzed the dynamics and
affinities between the endpoints of IoT malware based on the information released on the public
Internet in this study. Using data about users’ IP addresses and more detailed physical locations
could be used to analyze relationships within a narrower range.
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7.1.2 Obfuscated Malware Binaries
In this study, we used Radare2 to extract strings, especially IP addresses and keywords from non-
obfuscated malware binaries. Manual string extraction from obfuscated malware binary requires
a lot of time and effort. Therefore, we develop an automated tool for string extraction supporting
IoT diverse architectures and using Radare2’s API, and extract and analyze data for more range
of IoT malware binaries. This, however, does not take into account the fact that some malware
samples might be obfuscated, where our tool may not yield meaningful artifacts. This is indeed a
limitation, and we will explore in the future dynamic analysis-based and other de-obfuscation tools
that can be used to gain insight into string artifacts for obfuscated codes and binaries.
7.1.3 Dataset
Table 3.1 and Table 5.1 show the distribution of the families in the dataset utilized in this research.
The dataset is biased toward Gafgyt, where 95%, 88% of the samples belong to these family,
respectively. This bias is reflected in the dropzones chains, as 92.86% of the extracted chains
belong to Gafgyt family. Collecting more samples over longer period of time will enhance the
quality of the analysis, and the extracted chains. We note, however, that this family is the most
popular by far, and the findings in this work are of significant value given its prevalence.
7.1.4 Target Behavior
String static analysis may still not address some ambiguity of the exact behavior of a certain target.
To help understand the role of the referred IP addresses, we analyzed the samples with specific
keywords. However, it is not possible to match the behavior to a certain target. Therefore, we
assume that the behavior applies to all referred targets, as a form of extrapolation from a few tested
samples. Establishing statistical confidence in the findings, though a larger baseline.
59
7.1.5 Dropzones Chains
All extracted chains are limited by the collected dataset. The chain quality and size might increase
with the number of collected samples. In this dataset, all chains belong to Gafgyt and Mirai,
although we speculate that other IoT malware families will have similar behavior. Moreover, as
chains with various families may exist due to the combined malicious capabilities, we expect the
limited number of families analyzed in this study will not affect the generality of the findings; a
confirmation of the above anecdote.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that IoT devices have found multiple applications in our daily life, and the
number of those devices in use is soaring into the tens of billions. Simultaneously, adversaries
target the IoT devices for the lack of security mechanisms. To mitigate such threats, we need to
understand the IoT malware ecosystem and underlying dynamics.
In this research, we perform IP and network centric analysis to investigate affinities among the
endpoints. We analyze the≈78.2% of total responsive public IPv4 endpoints among dropzones and
their targets as extracted from IoT software and spread across the globe from diverse perspectives.
First, we analyze the dropzone-target inter-relationship and look for the affinity between them. We
observe that the list of targets is shared between attackers, or are compiled using similar conditions
on IoT search engines like Shodan or Censys. For our geographical analysis, we comprehensively
analyzed the distribution of the number of dropzones and targets (country-, state-, and city-level).
We visualize the target areas representing dropzone locations and their size scaled by the number
of associated targets. Also, we analyze the attack exposure of endpoints and correlate to the risk
they possess. These endpoints need to be carefully and individually analyzed to extract patterns
for predicting the chances of them being compromised.
Moreover, we utilized IoT search engines to facilitate network penetration analysis of the drop-
zones and target IPs. We extract information such as the organization, the number of active ports,
and vulnerabilities associated with the IP address. Knowing which network ports are open for a
particular IP address can potentially allow attackers to exploit them for DDoS attacks, the usage
should be limited. Seeing the number of vulnerabilities associated with dropzone IP addresses, for
example, reveals the level of risk involved and which malware instances they are associated with.
Our analysis also sheds light on the tolerance of organizations towards the endpoints with mali-
cious intent. The tug of war between the profit and the loss of trust among the users (prospective
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domain buyers) deserve the focus of the community.
We analyzed IoT malware binaries to understand the dependencies and relationships among mal-
ware. We conduct static analysis to extract the addresses communicated to or referred by the
malware. Among a large number of endpoints in static malware artifacts, we identified dependen-
cies between dropzones, in which we coin the dropzones chain. We identified 56 unique chains
and unveiled interactions among Gafgyt and Mirai families. Further analysis showed the existence
of centralization within chains with higher node counts, where a central dropzone communicates
with several dropzones in a decentralized fashion. We suggest central dropzone monitoring and
removal, in order to understand and limit the impact of the malware.
We propose a defense method to suggest to countries, where enterprises can use this information to
improve their security. In the academic space, this comprehensive analysis is lacking, and is likely
to stimulate further explorations. We sum up our research results, we choose suspicious ports.
Moreover, we analyze open ports distributed by country, and vulnerabilities of each port. Through
this analysis, we can block ports by country. We can expect the mitigation strategies through these
port blocks, can be used by companies in each country.
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